1. We've pretty much rung Brookfield dry. However, . . .

"A difference to be a difference has to make a difference." Obviously, there is a difference between "initial interest confusion" in brick and mortar world and in cyberspace. Do we think it makes a difference; that a plaintiff should have a higher hurdle to clear in demonstrating initial interest confusion in cyberspace?

How much difference does there need to be in domain names? E.g., If "moviebuff.com" is a protected trademark could you use "movie_buff.com," "AMovieBuff.com," "4MovieBuffs.com," "MovieBuffsRUs.com," "CaliforniaMovieBuff.com"? How about "moviebuff.uk," or "moviebuff.org"? Or perhaps a porn site, "MoviesInTheBuff.com"?

How much weight should we give to disclaimers and links? E.g., "Looking for Brookfield's MovieBuff software? Click here." At a minimum should its existence go to the issue of the defendant's intent? To damages?

And how relevant is "intent" anyway; i.e., if "confusion" is what we're trying to prevent, shouldn't this be a case of "liability without fault" (like the old defamation standard)? Ditto if the defendant intends to confuse but through incompetence totally fails?

NEWS ITEM: Google is in the news with a trademark issue related to our discussion, and specifically to question 4, p. 56. Geico and American Blind and Wallpaper (in separate suits in separate courts), both of which have trademarks on their names, contend that it is a trademark infringement for Google to create an advertising algorithm that not only plays off of their trademark and the business they are in, but then brings up on the Google-user's screen, in the right hand column, paid ads/links to their competitors' sites! What do we think the law is? What do we think the law ought to be? Is there confusion? Initial interest confusion? Dilution? Is Google in competition with them? Is is using their trademarks? What analogy/similarity do you see between Geico's real concern and eBay's real concern [eBay v. Bidders Edge, p. 27]? (If you'd like to see one of many news sources reporting this story, here's one: http://news.com.com/Google+wins+in+trademark+suit+with+Geico/2100-1024_3-5491704.html )

2. Planned Parenthood, p. 56.

Once again, we have the question of how close to "Planned Parenthood" someone can get with a domain name before it constitutes a trademark violation. planningparenting.org?

What would you have advised Planned Parenthood (and your other clients) to avoid problems like this?

Is there any way that Bucci could have prevented the "initial interest confusion" conclusion, given the analysis in PETA (or is the PETA standard limited to parodies)?

How relevant, and in what connection is it relevant, that Bucci's site opens with "Welcome to the Planned Parenthood Home Page"?

Judge Wood focuses on the "in commerce" requirement. Some of his language/analysis hints that he may have the concept confused with another. What does he seem to be thinking about? Or is he right to have that focus, and I am wrong, and if so, why?

Different question, different focus: What do you think Congress had in mind with "commerce"? Do you think it intended to include a parody site that also carried advertising unrelated to the business of the plaintiff?

Do you agree with Judge Wood's analysis of "proximity" and "market"?

How would you fashion the argument for Bucci that Judge Wood seems to hint at (top of p. 61) regarding the First Amendment -- given Bucci's intent that he deliberately confuse Internet users?

What is this distinction between a "communicative message" and "identification of product origin" (p. 62)?

3. PETA, p. 63.

 What is Judge Gregory's standard for a permissible parody that makes use of a trademark? How could Dougherty have complied with it?

Would TakeAVegetarianToLunch-AndEatHim.com/PETA do it?

What is the judge's definition of "commerce" in the context of this case?

What about the "moving in next door" example in question 3, p. 65? What if Bucci puts a sign in his window: "Value life? Planned Parenthood, next door, performs abortions." In short, a factual, non-defamatory statement. Would that be OK? Given Judge Wood's analysis of "proximity" and "market" how and why should the online equivalent be treated differently?

Would bucci.com/PlannedParenthood (the "post domain path") be OK?

4. Loudoun County Public Library, p. 66

What's the difference between "mere disapproval of their content," "reasons of educational suitability" or "schools' inculcative mission"? For example, where do books about evolution, or creationism/intelligent design fit in this dichotomy?

Which analogies do you find most useful: The Internet is a "vast Interlibrary Loan system;" restricting Internet access is "merely a decision not to acquire;" "unlike a collection of books the Internet is a 'single, integrated system;'" "a set of encyclopedias" with selected articles blacked out; purchasing Internet access makes all Internet content accessible, by purchasing this one "publication" it has purchased them all; blocking sites is a "removal decision."

Question 2, p. 70: Does the "acquisition-removal" distinction make sense?

From a policy, as distinguished from a legal, perspective how might you fashion and rationalize an argument for library discretion in limiting Internet access?

Question 5: Law aside, is it factually accurate to say that "each Loudoun library has made all Internet publications instantly accessible to its patrons''?