Although some parents philosophically believe that their minor children should be allowed access to the Internet and all of its pornographic web-sites, a great number of parents strive to protect their children from such material until they conclude their children are mature enough.  A problem arises when parents cannot supervise their children's Internet activities because they have access to computers outside of the home.  Many parents are concerned that when their children use Internet services at school or in public venues such as the library, they may be subjected to indecent, harmful, and even illegal materials.  Child access to pornography on the Internet has become a topic of increasing debate and litigation.  While the parents have been debating, adolescents between the ages of twelve and seventeen have become one of the largest consumer groups of "adult-oriented" material on the Internet.1

In an attempt to prevent children from being subjected to materials that may cause them harm, Congress recently passed yet another statute, The Children's Internet Protection Act of 2000 (hereinafter "CHIPA").  In short, CHIPA requires public schools and libraries, which receive federal funding for Internet usage to install approved filtering systems in all of their computers.  The statute provides for the disabling of these systems in certain circumstances, however, the American Library Association and others have brought suit claiming that the filtering systems currently available are overbroad and therefore infringe on the first amendment rights of children and adults alike.

Although CHIPA addresses Internet access by minors in both public schools and libraries, this paper will focus only on the Act's constitutionality as applied in the public library setting.2  I argue that although CHIPA is likely unconstitutional under First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis, Congress could easily alter the current statute, resulting in the effective and constitutional prevention of minor-access to pornographic materials on the Internet at public libraries.

I. THE COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST: WHY DOES CONGRESS FEEL THE NEED TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY?

Protecting children from sexually obscene material has been well-established to be a compelling state interest.3  Based on that interest, the Supreme Court has held that states may prohibit the distribution or sale to minors of sexually explicit material deemed obscene, indecent, or "harmful," to minors, while that same material would not be considered "obscene" as to adults.4  In Ginsberg, the Court stated that states may regulate the sale of material that is "harmful to minors" under the age of seventeen if the material (1) predominately appeals to the prurient, shameful, or morbid interest of minors, (2) is patently offensive to prevailing community standards, and (3) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.5

A. WHAT IS AVAILABLE TO CHILDREN VIA THE INTERNET?

Internet access has become routine in schools and public libraries, and therefore millions of American schoolchildren now have easy access to the Internet and all of its contents.  Furthermore, children are encouraged to use the medium as an efficient learning and communication tool.  Such liberal access is not without concern, however.  Because the information obtainable via the Internet is limitless, children are able to access extreme amounts of information about any topic, regardless of the "appropriateness" of the information.6

Vendors of sexually explicit material have increasingly been establishing Internet web sites as the demand for pornography via that medium has skyrocketed.7  Some websites offer images for free while others require a paid subscription to interact with their site.  Nonetheless, vendors reap financial reward from both subscriptions or advertisements placed on the websites.  The "nature and degree of explicitness" varies from "soft core" porn, including semi-nude models and erotic images, to "hard core," often obscene pornography which cater to a variety of sexual preferences including homosexuality, bisexuality, sado-masochisim, beastiality, and fetishism.8  Essentially, having unrestricted access to the Internet provides children with what is analogous to subscriptions to the most vulgar, extremely pornographic "smut" magazines available (and unavailable) on the market.

B. EFFECTS OF VIEWING "HARMFUL" MATERIAL ON CHILDREN.

Through the Internet, children have unlimited access to pornographic and vividly descriptive text which are, oftentimes, more deviant than those contained in printed materials.9  Moreover, children not only have unfettered access to "regular" deviant pornography, but they also have access to "child pornography," a form of expression in which the Supreme Court has already ruled that the state has a compelling interest in regulating.10  "Regular" pornography may also have adverse affects on immature viewers.  Some studies indicate that viewing pornography which depicts violence toward women is associated with an increase the frequency of violence against women.11  Some researchers believe that pornography degrades women and reinforces their inferior social status because such images and text reduces to women to objects and depicts women as subjects of violence.12  Furthermore, many opponents to pornography assert that viewing pornography disturbs the natural growth and well being of children's sexuality as it fails to depict a healthy representation of sexuality.13

II. PAST CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS AT REGULATING PORNOGRAPHY OBTAINED VIA THE INTERNET.

A. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF 1996

Congress first attempted to regulate children's access to indecent and offensive material via the Internet in the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA").14  The CDA prohibited both the known transmission of "indecent" Internet communications to minors under 18 years old, and the communication of "patently offensive" sexually explicit messages accessible to those under 18 years old.15  CDA's constitutionality  was immediately challenged by various groups that published, or were associated with other entities that published, materials on the Internet.16  The Supreme Court held that the CDA was in fact unconstitutional because it precluded too much adult access to constitutionally protected speech.17  The most significant effect of the Court's holding in Reno is that any Congressional attempt to legislate this matter in the future will "not pass constitutional muster unless it is narrowly-drawn enough to meet the standard set forth in Reno.18

B. THE CHILD ON-LINE PROTECTION ACT.

In response to Reno, Congress searched for new methods to restrict children's access to pornography and other harmful material through the Internet, resulting in the "Child On-Line Protection Act ("COPA").19  COPA imposes civil and criminal penalties on any person who, by use of the Web, knowingly communicated, for "commercial purposes," material deemed "harmful to minors" unless that person also made a "good faith effort to restrict access by minors."20  COPA ultimately met the same fate as the CDA in a case coined "Reno II,"21 in which a temporary restraining order against COPA's enforcement issued by Third Circuit was upheld by the Third Circuit, which ruled that COPA imposed an unconstitutional burden on speech.22

III. CHILDREN'S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT.

The Children's Internet Protection Act (CHIPA), Congress' most recent attempt to protect children from the snare of Internet pornography, was signed in December 2000 by President Clinton.23  CHIPA requires public libraries that receive federal funding24 to install and enforce the use of "blocking" software on all of the library's computers with Internet access in order to prevent library patrons, adults and minors alike, from accessing visual or textual depictions that classified as obscene, child pornography, or "harmful to minors".25  Despite this mandate, Congress did not specify which technical methods of blocking or filtering should be utilized.26

A. FILTERS.

Filters are software programs that impede the transmission of certain types of data over the Internet.27  Two methods for blocking data - word blocking and site blocking - are primarily utilized.  Word blocking, the more inaccurate of the two methods, matches websites against a list of keywords.  If the site matches the keywords, the website data is blocked.  Site blocking matches Internet websites against a predetermined list of sites which have been created by human review.28  Due to the large number of "hidden" sites as well as the perpetual creation of new sites, site-blocking lists must be continuously updated.  Most filter providers readily provide these updates, however, some charge maintenance fees for doing so.29  When a site is erroneously obstructed - or transmitted - the filter owner may add or delete specific web sites through a local database.  The biggest disadvantage of site blocking is the subjective nature of the filters; there is no judicial or legislative review of blocked sites, which may in fact contain constitutionally protected expression.30

A statute is overbroad if it not only proscribes unconstitutional activities, but it also proscribes speech or conduct, which is protected by the First Amendment.31  Opponents of blocking and filtering software programs argue that they are all over-broad because of their inadvertent obstruction of many sites which contain expression that is not obscene, indecent, or "harmful to minors".32  For example, with regard to work blocking programs, many innocuous web sites contain "keywords" that cause the site to be filtered out.  For example, if "XXX" is contained on a list of keywords, not only would many pornographic sites be blocked with the use of this filter, but also the website for "Superbowl XXX".33  In order for a statute to be invalidated due to overbreadth, the overbreadth must be "substantial" compared with the legitimate applications of the statute.34  Because filters admittedly prevent access to a large number of protected websites,35 the Court would likely hold that the mandatory use of filters in public libraries is overbroad and could not be applied to adult library patrons.36

B. ALTERNATIVES TO FILTERS.

Based on the inaccuracies of all filtering systems, opponents of library-filters have recommended the use of alternative methods to prevent children from accessing pornography via library computers.37  Despite the fact that filters are not utilized, all of the proposed alternatives also raise significant constitutional, efficiency and ethical questions as well.

One proposed alternative is to place the computer terminals in direct view of the reference desk so that either the patrons will be too "shamed" to view the indecent materials, or the reference librarian can continuously look over the patrons' shoulders to determine whether their screens are displaying "appropriate" material.38  This alternative is not superior to the filtering alternative for two reasons.  First, the constant supervision by a librarian may "chill" the First Amendment rights of patrons just as much as, if not more than, the disabling provisions outlined in CHIPA would.  Unlike researching via books which can be done in a remote corner of the library, children who must be in full view of a librarian may be embarrassed to look up particular topics for fear that the librarian will view what is on the screen, despite the fact that it is a bone fide topic.  Although filters may filter out some protected speech, filters allow minor patrons their privacy rights while researching on the Internet.

Another proposed alternative to filtering is to create an exclusive list of sites to which minor patrons have access.39  The system would work analogous to having only a limited number of books on reserve for minors to read and denying them access to the rest of the library.  The reason this alternative may be desirable is that librarians and parents alike do not have to worry about inappropriate web sites leaking through the under-inclusive filters.  However, this alternative obviously would deny minors access to a great majority of protected information, and therefore is not superior to the filtering mechanism.

C. EFFECT OF DISABLING PROVISIONS.

In an attempt to circumvent the over-breadth doctrine, Congress included a disabling provision that permits administrators and supervisors to disable the blocking/filtering to allow unfettered Internet access for "bona fide research or other lawful purposes."40  The ALA criticizes CHIPA for not imposing clear guidelines concerning when the filters must be disabled in order to protect patrons' First Amendment rights.41  Additionally, the ALA argues that the disabling provision will impermissibly chill speech and impose an "unconstitutional stigma" on speech as it "forces adult patrons to petition the government for access to otherwise protected speech".42
This argument is not entirely persuasive in light of a recent decision concerning adult Internet access on state-owned computers in state-run facilities.  The Fourth Circuit, recently held that policies which required state-employed faculty to request the disabling of Internet filtering software in order to access sexually explicit materials on state-owned computers did not impose an unconstitutional stigma on the computer patrons, and the policies did not impermissibly chill speech.43  In any event, even if the disabling provision does not save the statute as to adult library patrons, it likely does for minor library patrons.44

D. CURRENT LITIGATION.

The American Library Association ("ALA"), a number libraries and library patrons, state library associations and the Freedom to Read Foundation brought suit against the United States challenging the constitutionality of CHIPA.45  The ALA claims that CHIPA is unconstitutional as it makes federal funding and discounts for Internet use in public libraries contingent on the libraries abiding by content and viewpoint restrictions on constitutionally protected speech.46

IV. IS CHIPA CONSTITUTIONAL, AND IF NOT, CAN IT BE SAVED?

A. "ACQUISITION" VERSUS "REMOVAL".

The constitutionality of filtering software depends greatly on how the courts characterize the filter's effects.  Opponents of filtering argue that filtering systems are analogous to "removals" of library materials, and courts look with disdain on book removals intended to establish "orthodoxy".47  Furthermore, they view filtering of sites as making the Internet "incomplete," just as en encyclopedia would be incomplete if librarians ripped out pages with the intent of discouraging particular expressions.48

Advocates of filtering systems in public libraries view Internet access as an eclectic "acquisition" of material from a variety of different authors, organizations, and publishers.  The Internet, they argue, behaves as a "medium of publication," as it does not have a single sponsor or publisher, nor does it have a unifying topic, theme, or format, and its parts do not depend on another the way a film's or novel's parts do.  Accordingly, they ask, "if libraries do not provide access to Hustler, then why force libraries to provide unfettered access to Internet pornography?"49  Qualitative judgments concerning which books or periodicals will be made available to the public via libraries are an inherent part of the funding process of public libraries.50  Interestingly, not one public library in the nation collects Hyu Hustler magazine.  These purely discretionary challenges were rarely challenged until the Internet established its importance in the communication and educational sector.

Furthermore, it is established that although state officials may not ban a magazine w/ offensive pictures or works of art, it does not follow that the state is required to fund magazines or to provide a state-owned facility, such as a library, to exhibit such material.51  Accordingly, although the state is subsidizing the use of the Internet,52 it does not follow that the state must subsidize every expression available via the Internet's pervasive mode of communication.

 If courts were apt to characterize the Internet and its filtering software as analogous to the "acquisition" of books and periodicals which has historically been left to the discretion of library officials with minimal debate, the use of filtering systems and CHIPA would like be constitutional.  Unfortunately, however, a recent landmark decision analogized this case to the "removal" of library materials, which may infringe on patrons' right to receive information.53  Furthermore, the Court has stated in a plurality opinion, that books may not be removed from a library "simply because they dislike the ideas contained [in them]," thereby "prescrib[ing] what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matter of opinion."54  If the Court follows the Mainstream Loudon II holding, the use of filtering systems will have to undergo strict constitutional scrutiny, and will likely be found unconstitutional - at least with respect to adult library patrons.

B. AS TO ADULTS: CHIPA IS LIKELY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

As applied to adults, CHIPA most likely will not withstand judicial scrutiny in light of recent Court decisions.55  Although Congress is attempting to legislate an established compelling state interest - namely encouraging the moral, healthy, maturation of American youth by preventing minors from viewing material deemed "harmful" to them56 - filtering software is likely not sufficiently tailored to those goals.57  The Court in Reno v. ACLU, recently held that the right to receive information as to adults applied without qualification of expression to the Internet and that right is "entitled to maximum constitutional protection".58  Reno invalidated a statute that "effectively suppressed a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another."59  Thus, as to adults, Reno likely invalidates the use of filters on computers frequented by adult-users as a "substantial" number of web-sites to which adults have a constitutionally protected right to receive information would be precluded through the use of the filters.  Additionally, the disclaimer provision will likely not save the statute as to adults because of the established "unconstitutional stigma" created by having to request the removal of the filters.60  As to minor-patrons, however, Reno definitely leaves room for debate.

C. AS TO CHILDREN: APPLYING SOMETHING LESS THAN STRICT SCRUTINY... CHIPA MAY BE CONSTITUTIONAL.

A. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS.

"A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens."61  "Accordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights."62   The law frequently treats children differently from adults, and that difference is justified by a perception that children's cognition, social skills, moral values, and competencies are not fully developed.63  Areas in which the courts have allowed an imposition of restrictions on the constitutional rights of minors include, right to have an abortion,64 right to due process,65 right to contract,66 to marry,67 to sue or be sued,68 to vote,69 and the right to purchase alcohol.70
More importantly, the Courts has held that some types of infringement upon minor's First Amendment rights are justifiable as well: "A State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child is not possessed of the full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees."71  Accordingly, states have the ability to limit minors' right to receive information by preventing minors from purchasing non-obscene pornographic materials,72 and attending R-Rated movies.73  In addition, states have the ability to limit certain types of expression by minors, such as the imposition of certain restrictions on speech with regard to a school newspaper.74

B. WITH A FEW ALTERATIONS, CHIPA WOULD NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INFRINGE UPON MINORS' FREE SPEECH RIGHTS.

As to adults, CHIPA is likely unconstitutional because the means of restricting adult-access to library computers - even with a disabling provision - are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to the goal of protecting children from obscene, indecent and "harmful" material.  As to children, however, it is clear that the courts have much more leeway in restricting minors' rights in order to protect and nurture the nation's children appropriately.75

In order for CHIPA to be constitutional, even as to children, a few minor revisions would have to be made.

First, CHIPA would have to mandate that libraries must have separate computers for children and adults, which were located in separate parts of the library building.  The two computers must only be separated enough so that children were not exposed to any "harmful" materials conveyed through adult-used computer screens.  Only the minor-allocated computers would contain a filtering system.  The adult computers would be free from filtering, however, patrons would be notified of the prohibition of the viewing of "obscene" materials at the library.

Second, rather than allow a discretionary disabling system, CHIPA should provide that library officials must disable the filter upon request if the child sites a "bona fide" research purpose.  A "bona fide" purpose would be any purpose unrelated to topics, which are obscene, indecent, or "harmful to minors".

Third, parents of minors must be allowed to sign a waiver allowing their child access to the adult computers.

This leaves one remaining question: Would CHIPA - amended to provide for (1) physically separated adult and children computers, (2) a mandatory disabling provision for bona fide research purposes, and (3) a parental waiver allowing their child to utilize adult computers - be sufficiently narrow to pass constitutional muster as to children's First Amendment rights?  Clearly it does.

First, this amended regulation would only apply to children, a class which experiences curtailments of their constitutional rights, which  Congress and our courts  have justified based on children's immaturity and society's interest in raising mature, healthy and functional adults.

Second, this regulation is taking place in state-funded libraries which have never been a forum in which patrons could access vast amounts of obscene, indecent and harmful materials.  Furthermore, even though the state cannot ban certain pornographic materials, it does not follow that the state must financially support that activity either.  Although libraries are resources for all types of information, libraries have historically and uncontrovertibly held discretionary power over which materials were available to the public.  Determining what the library provides access to via the Internet medium is no different than their historical discretionary powers.

Thirdly, despite the fact that filters are overbroad due to the blockage of constitutionally protected expressions, an amended disabling provision with mandatory guidelines saves this statute as to minors.  The "unconstitutional stigma" that the Mainstream Loudoun Court found as to adults should not apply to children due to the interest the state has in protecting children from harmful material.

1 See Hearings on Protecting Children from Obscenity on the Internet Before the House Committee on Commerce, 105th Cong. 22 (1998) (statement of Rep. Earnest Istook, Oklahoma).

2 Although children retain First Amendment rights in the school setting, the Court has qualified the First Amendment rights available to children in the school setting.  See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969).  According to Tinker, schools may restrict their students' free speech rights to the extent that it "materially and substantially" disrupts school operations.  Id. at 511.

3

4 Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).

5 Id.

6 See Peter G. Drever, III, The Best of Both Worlds: Financing Software Filters for the Classroom and Avoiding First Amendment Liability, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 659, 660-61 (1998).

7 61 AM. JUR. 3D §3 (2001).

8 Id.

9 See Laura J. McKay, The Communications Decency Act: Protection Children from On-Line Indecency, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 468, 473 (1996), citing Philip Elmer-DeWitt, et al., On a Screen Near You: It's Popular, Pervasive and Surprisingly Perverse, According to the First Survey of On-Line Erotica, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38 (stating that images available on an Internet bulletin board, which may not be found in adult pornographic magazines, include extremely deviant sexual behavior).

10 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).  "[T]he use of children as ... subjects of pornographic materials is very harmful to both the children and the society as a whole." Id. at 756 fn.9.  "It has been found that sexually exploited children are unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships in later life, have sexual dysfunctions, and have a tendency to become sexual abusers as adults".  Id., citing Schoettle, Child Exploitation: A Study of Child Pornography, 19 J.AM.ACAD.CHILD PSYCHIATRY 289, 296 (1980).

11 See Edward Donnerstein, et al., The Question of Pornography: Research Findings and Policy Implications 105 (1987).

12 Stephen J. Gould, The Production, Marketing, and Consumption of Sexually Explicit Material in Our Sexually Conflicted Society, 11 J. OF PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 135, 139 (1992).

13 Id.

14

15 47 U.S.C. 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1997); Kathleen Conn, Protecting Children from Internet Harm (Again): Will the Children's Internet Protection Act Survive Judicial Scrutiny? 153 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 469, 471 (2001).

16 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, 824-27 (E.D.Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

17 Id.

18 Elizabeth M. Shea, The Children's Internet Protection Act of 1999: Is Internet Filtering Software the Answer?  24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 167, 190 (1999).

19 Id.

20 Id. at 191. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 7 (1998)).

21

22 UCLA v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3rd Cir. 2000).

23

24 E-Rate and LSTA programs - need citations.

25 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B) & (C); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1).

26 Conn, supra note __ at 486.

27 Public Library Association, Plain Facts About Internet Filtering Software, at http://www.pla.org/publications/technotes/technotes_filtering.html (2002).

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Id.

31 See e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm'rs of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574-75 (1987) (holding that a regulation restricting all "First Amendment activities" within an airport's "Terminal Area" was facially unconstitutional under the over-breadth doctrine).

32

33 Public Library Association, Plain Facts About Internet Filtering Software, at http://www.pla.org/publications/technotes/technotes_filtering.html (2002).

34 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, ___ (1973) (stating that where overbreadth is not substantial, unconstitutional applications of the law should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis).

35

36 See e.g., Mainstream Loudon II at 566 (declaring policy reqruing the Loudon County Library to use X-STOP filtering software on its library computers facially over-broad because it limited adult Internet access to a level appropriate for minors).

38 See, Angela Napili, Pornography, Internet Filters, and Your Public Library, at www.si.umich.edu/Community/connections/pro_InternetPorn6.html (2002).

39

40 Conn, supra note ___  at 491-92 (2001).

41

42  Mainstream Loudoun I, 2 F.Supp.2d at 797.

43 Urofsky v. Gilmore, 167 F.3d 191, __, opinion vac. on reh. en banc (4th Cir. 1999); opinion reissued, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000); cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 759 (2001) (affirming the regulation of adult access to the Internet by upholding a Virginia statute restricting state employees from accessing sexually explicit material on the state's computers).

44 See Infra ___.

45 American Library Association, at http://www.ala.org/CHIPA/med325.html (2002).

46 American Library Association, at http://www.ala.org/pio/presskits/CHIPA/pressrelease.html (2002).

47 See generally, Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982).

48

49 Connections in Community Networking, at http://www.si.umich.edu/Community/connections/pro_InternetPorn1.html
50 Mark C. Rahdert, Preserving the Archives of Freedom: Justice Blackmun and First Amendment Protections for Libraries 97 Dick. L. Rev. 437, 449 (1993).

51 Id.; Case Name, 532 F.2d 792 (1st cir. 1976); 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1970).

52

53 Mainstream at 792; is this the right citation - the most recent case?

54 Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Tr. of the Loudoun County Library, 2 F.Supp.2d 783, 793 (E.D. Va. 1998), citing Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872 (1982).

55 See generally, Reno.

56 See Supra -__.

57 See Supra - __.

58 Reno at 874.  See also, Sund v. City of Wichita Falls, 121 F. Supp. 2d 530, 548 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3d Cir. 1992) (The right to receive information "is vigorously enforced in the context of a public library, 'the quintessential locus of the receipt of information'")

59 Reno at 874 (emphasis added).

60 See Supra ___.

61 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 168 (1944).

62 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, ___, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3354 (1982).  See also, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that a statute prohibiting use of a child to distribute literature on the street was valid notwithstanding the statute's effect on a First Amendment activity); Ginsberg v. NY, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (sustaining New York  statute protecting children from expose to NON-obscene literature); FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)  (stating Government's interest in the "well-being of its youth" justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting received by adults as well as children)

63 67 ICHILR 1233, 1254-55.

64 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US 622, 634-39 (1979).

65 Parham v. J.R., 442 US 584, 604 (1979) (concluding that children's interests were best served by refusing to recognize their due process right to an independent hearing prior to a mental health commitment).

66 2 Samuel Williston, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 222-48 (3d ed. 1959), cited by 7 NTDJLEPP 423 at 463 n.57.

67 See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Rethinking Marital Age Restrictions, 22 J. FAM.L. 1 (1983-84) (reviewing various state laws on marital age restrictions), cited by 7 NTDJLEPP 423 at 463 n. 58.

68

69 Ritchie Case.

70 SD v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (requiring states to increase their minimum drinking ages to 21 in order to retain the full amount of federal highway funds).

71 Tinker at 515 (Stewart, J. concurring).

72 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629, ___(1968).

73 Cheeseman v. American Multi-Cinema, 310 N.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. Mich. 1981).

74 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, ___ (1988).

75 See Supra ___.